Florida’s Contradiction and the Tipped Employees’ Plight: Why the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 Mandates that Florida Raise the Tipped Minimum Wage and the Necessary Standard of Review by Jamy E. Barreau
Barry Law Review
Volume 22
Issue 2 Spring 2017 Article 5
6-23-2017
Florida’s Contradiction and the Tipped Employees’
Plight: Why the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992
Mandates that Florida Raise the Tipped Minimum
Wage and the Necessary Standard of Review
Jamy E. Barreau
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Other
Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Barry Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Barry Law Review by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Barry Law.
Recommended Citation
Jamy E. Barreau (2017) "Florida’s Contradiction and the Tipped Employees’ Plight: Why the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992




FLORIDA’S CONTRADICTION AND THE TIPPED EMPLOYEES’ 
PLIGHT: WHY THE FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1992 
MANDATES THAT FLORIDA RAISE THE TIPPED MINIMUM WAGE 
AND THE NECESSARY STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Jamy E. Barreau* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The minimum wage has been a part of the nation’s norm since Saturday, June 
25, 1938, with the signing of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”).1 The 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 took on a role to combat unsavory child labor 
practices, set the maximum work week to forty-four hours, and set the first minimum 
wage in our nation at twenty-five cents per hour.2 Since then, as inflation occurred, 
the law has kept its stride with the times, increasing by seven dollars since its incep-
tion.3 Meanwhile, according to the Florida Constitution: 
All working Floridians are entitled to be paid a minimum wage that 
is sufficient to provide a decent and healthy life for them and their 
families, that protects their employers from unfair low-wage com-
petition, and that does not force them to rely on taxpayer-funded 
public services in order to avoid economic hardship.4 
However, a caveat exists regarding Florida’s Constitution regarding minimum 
wage. “For tipped Employees meeting eligibility requirements for the tip credit un-
der the FLSA, Employers may credit towards satisfaction of the Minimum Wage tips 
up to the amount of the allowable FLSA tip credit in 2003.”5 Also, the “required cash 
wage” of a tipped employee “must be at least $2.13.”6 Meanwhile, Florida has man-
dated that “[i]t is an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to compensation . . . because of such indi-
vidual’s race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or mar-
ital status.”7  
 ________________________  
 *  Jamy Ernst Barreau, Barry University School of Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2017; University of 
Central Florida, B.S., Legal Studies, December 2013. 
 1. Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a Minimum Wage, U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/flsa1938.htm (last visited May 26, 2016) 
 2. Id. 
 3. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(c) (2016). 
 4. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 24(a). 
 5. Id. § 24(c). 
 6. Wage and Hour Division, Fact Sheet #15: Tipped Employees Under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA) 1, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs15.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 
2016). 
 7. FLA. STAT. § 760.10(1)(a) (2016). 
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Tipped employees are scavenging for tips to supplement their minimum wage 
while the other working population of Florida is guaranteed a “healthy life for them 
and their families . . . and [a wage] that does not force them to rely on taxpayer-
funded public services . . . .”8 Meanwhile, it is up to the Floridian public to determine 
just how hard tipped employees should work in order to earn their minimum wage. 
An issue with the tipping system as it stands is that it creates situations where an 
employer’s good intentions may backfire on the tipped employee.9 For example, sup-
pose an owner of a restaurant establishes a rule where patrons must pay “[a] com-
pulsory charge for service, for example, 15 percent of the bill.”10 “Such charges are 
part of the employer’s gross receipts.”11 “Sums distributed to employees from service 
charges cannot be counted as tips received, but may be used to satisfy the employer’s 
minimum wage and overtime obligations under the FLSA.”12 Such a system does not 
go to aid tipped employees, but to benefit their employers by satisfying tip credit 
requirements. Therefore, the tipped employee under a compulsory charge situation 
is not afforded the same tax benefits attached to being able to count said compulsory 
charges as tips received. 
Another issue with the current tipped-employee system is that tipped employees 
do not have a legal recourse against these consumers that would discriminate against 
them and provide them with a smaller tip than they otherwise would have earned.13 
Under a normal employee discrimination context, an employee would be able to find 
recourse from the courts,14 but the case is not the same in the tipped-employee con-
text. Presently, no standard of review exists to combat this specific issue plaguing 
the Floridian public. This Note discusses why the caveat imposed on employees in 
tipped positions should be abolished and proposes a standard of review for the courts 
to follow in rectifying these situations. This Note further discusses the lingering so-
cial biases attached to the tipping system; a proposed standard of review to allow 
legal recourse; and how based on this socially-sanctioned discrimination, the tipping 
system must be altered in the State of Florida. 
II. EVOLUTION OF WAGES 
A. Wages in the Colonies 
In order to properly analyze Florida’s tipped employees’ plight, it is important 
to first assess the origins of wages in the United States. Also, it is important to discuss 
the consequences involved with improper wage considerations within a particular 
jurisdiction. Wage is defined as “[p]ayment for labor or services . . . based on time 
worked or quantity produced; [specifically], compensation of an employee based on 
 ________________________  
 8. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 24(a). 
 9. See Wage and Hour Division, supra note 6, at 3. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Lu-in Wang, At the Tipping Point: Race and Gender Discrimination in a Common Economic Transac-
tion, 21 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 101 (2014). 
 14. See generally FLA. STAT. § 760.07 (providing legal recourse for unlawful discrimination). 
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time worked or output of production.”15 Since before our country’s inception, even 
the American Colonies had a serious discussion about wages.16 For employers, it was 
proving to be a problem to employ people in the colonies in 1625.17 In fact, in 1625, 
wages in the American Colonies were considered “excessive” compared to those 
wages being earned in England.18 Workers in the American Colonies could earn 
“three times the wages for their [labor] they [could] in England or Wales . . . .”19  
Despite the difference in rate of pay between English workers and workers in 
the American Colonies, the Colonies were faced with a scarce supply of workers.20 
More specifically, skilled craftsmen were a scarcity in the Colonies, causing employ-
ers in the budding country to make the decision to “raise their wages to an excessive 
rate . . . .”21 These pressures led to two employment reforms in the Northern and 
Southern Colonies: indentured servitude and slavery, respectively.22  
“An indentured servant was one who came to the New World under a contract 
either with a planter who imported him to the colony, or with the ship owner or 
merchant who transported him for the purpose of disposing of his services upon ar-
rival.”23 The key distinction between slavery and indentured servitude lies in the fact 
that slavery involved the lifelong ownership of a person, while indentured servitude 
involved the “ownership of a person’s labor for a fixed period.”24 More specifically, 
indentured servitude carried with it a voluntary aura, unlike with slavery.25 For in-
stance, “[s]ervants used two types of contracts to finance their immigration . . . in-
denture and redemption contracts.”26 
An indenture contract involved a person signing a document before seeking pas-
sage to the Colonies.27 Such a document would specify the terms of the servant’s 
services to be performed in the New World “in exchange for their passage.”28 Mean-
while, a redemption contract involved a person agreeing to pay for passage to the 
New World after the voyage was completed.29 Indentured servants, who could con-
sist of men, women, or children, would serve their masters for four to seven years.30 
In exchange, as opposed to a traditional wage, these indentured servants would be 
 ________________________  
 15. Wage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 16. History of Wages in the United States from Colonial Times to 1928: Bulletin of the United States Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, No. 604, FRASER 7 (1934), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/scribd/?ti-
tle_id=4126&filepath=/files/docs/publications/bls/bls_0604_1934.pdf [hereinafter History of Wages]. 
 17. See id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 8. 
 22. History of Wages, supra note 16, at 8. 
 23. Id. at 27. 
 24. Alfred L. Brophy, Law and Indentured Servitude in Mid-Eighteenth Century Pennsylvania, 28 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 69, 76 (1991). 
 25. See id. at 85. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Indentured Servants, STRATFORD HALL, http://www.stratfordhall.org/educational-resources/teacher-re-
sources/indentured-servants/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2016). 
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housed and fed by their masters for the term of their contracts.31 As an ultimate pay-
ment on the indenture contract, the servants were compensated with “freedom dues 
of corn, tools, and clothing, and [were] allowed to leave [their master’s] plantation” 
after their contract terms were satisfied.32 
Indentured servants sacrificed important life goals, such as getting married or 
having children, in pursuit of their wages.33 Indentured servants were not even per-
mitted to leave their master’s plantation without permission.34 Furthermore, “[a]n 
unruly indentured servant was whipped or punished for improper behavior.”35  
Our nation’s early employment practices and those practiced today are indeed 
worlds apart. Today, the people of our nation are at least afforded protections by the 
law regarding wages.36 But the stark reality is that if the people of Florida are to learn 
any lesson from the past, it is to recognize the importance of proper regulation of 
wages. As noted above, all of the labor and strict rules that the indentured servants 
endured were in the name of obtaining what they contracted for. More simply put, 
the indentured servants sought their wages owed. 
As will be further discussed, the need for the government to regulate how em-
ployers pay their employees is dire. After all, it took an act of government to end 
slavery in this country for that method of labor to end. The same would ring true for 
the current state of wage affairs in Florida. At the inception of our nation, our fore-
fathers created a path that legalized more unsavory forms of wage earning.37 Flor-
ida’s government could have legislated in a way that would afford tipped employees 
equal protection, but instead of regulating wages in a way that would allow our state 
to prosper, the Floridian government opted to legislate in a way that would allow 
tipped employees to be treated in a different manner than non-tipped employees.38 
Such a distinction allows tipped employees to have their wages supplemented by the 
discretion of citizens and allows that discretion to be used to place tipped minority 
workers at a disadvantage. 
History is beginning to repeat itself. Just as employers sought unique ways of 
handling paying too much in wages to their employees by finding indentured serv-
ants and slaves, a similar trend can be seen in the tipped employee context. For in-
stance, employers of tipped employees have enjoyed a tip credit regarding their em-
ployees, without which, these employers would have had no choice but to pay their 
employees the full minimum wage mandated by the law.39 Such a system is reminis-
cent of the indentured servant system in that it resulted in an economic system con-
sisting of uncompensated or poorly compensated workers.40 The only difference that 
 ________________________  
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2016); see also FLA. CONST. art. X, § 24(a). 
 37. See History of Wages, supra note 16, at 8. 
 38. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. X, §§ 24(a)–(c). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Brophy, supra note 24, at 76. 
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exists today is that we are now in a new situation consisting of employer- and state-
sanctioned discrimination, as will be further outlined below. 
B. United States Federal Minimum Wage 
It is clear that the federal government has learned a lesson from the tribulations 
involved with indentured servitude.41 Today, it is mandated that in the United States 
[e]very employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any 
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 
commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or 
in the production of goods for commerce, wages at the following 
rate . . . $7.25 an hour.42 
Here, the federal government has clearly taken steps to secure a minimum wage for 
its employees. However, Congress has drawn a distinction between regular employ-
ees and tipped employees.43 
In determining the wage an employer is required to pay a tipped 
employee, the amount paid such employee by the employee’s em-
ployer shall be an amount equal to 
(1) the cash wage paid such employee which for purposes of 
such determination shall be not less than the cash wage required 
to be paid such an employee on… August 20, 1996; and  
(2)  an additional amount on account of the tips received by such 
employee which amount is equal to the difference between the 
wage specified in paragraph (1) and the wage in effect under 
section 206(a)(1) of this title.44 
The distinction between the required pay of tipped employees and the rate of pay of 
non-tipped employees lies in an “understanding . . . that tips will make up for the 
difference between the tipped and regular pay floor.”45 
The United States Department of Labor (“USDOL”) describes a tipped em-
ployee as an employee “who customarily and regularly receive[s] more than $30 per 
month in tips.”46 In order to legally avoid paying their employees the $7.25 minimum 
 ________________________  
 41. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2016).  
 42. Id. § 206(a)(1)(C). 
 43. 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (2016). 
 44. Id. §§ 203(m)(1), (2). 
 45. Roberto A. Ferdman, The Problem that’s Tearing Restaurants Apart, WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/08/20/theres-a-serious-problem-with-how-restaurants-pay-
their-staff/. 
 46. Wage and Hour Division, supra note 6. 
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wage mandated to regular employees, employers must take a “tip credit.”47 “[T]he 
maximum tip credit that an employer can currently claim under the FLSA… is 
$5.12… (the minimum wage of $7.25 minus the minimum required cash wage of 
$2.13).”48 The USDOL specifies that 
[e]mployers electing to use the tip credit provision must be able to 
show that tipped employees receive at least the minimum wage 
when direct (or cash) wages and the tip credit amount are combined. 
If an employee’s tips combined with the employer’s direct (or cash) 
wages of at least $2.13 per hour do not equal the minimum hourly 
wage of $7.25 per hour, the employer must make up the difference.49 
Admittedly, “[w]here an employee does not receive sufficient tips to make up 
the difference between the direct (or cash) wage payment (which must be at least 
$2.13 per hour) and the minimum wage, the employer must make up the differ-
ence.”50 However, trusting employers to abide by this rule has caused issues in Flor-
ida in the past.51 For instance, in Martins v. MRG of South Florida, Inc., Brunna 
Martins worked as a cocktail waitress for MRG of South Florida, Inc.52 “Martins 
alleged that she was paid less than the legal minimum wage by virtue of the fact that 
MRG took a ‘tip credit’ for hours Martins was in training and not earning tips.”53 
During her tenure with MRG, Martins’s hourly wage fell below the minimum wage 
when she was “charged for customer walk-outs and breakages.”54 
MRG “argued that even if Martins was paid a reduced wage for training . . . and 
[] for breakage and walkout expenses, Martins’[s] employment records and tax re-
turns showed that she never earned less than $4.23 per hour, the allowable minimum 
wage in Florida for tipped employees.”55 Therefore, MRG stood by its motion for 
summary judgment.56 However, the court in Martins explained that “the federal min-
imum wage was $7.25 an hour.”57 The court in Martins further stated that the “FLSA 
contains a provision which allows an employer to pay its tipped employees less by 
taking a ‘tip credit’ for the difference between the reduced wage and the regular 
minimum wage.”58 Therefore, “[u]nder Florida law, the highest tip credit an em-
ployer can take is $3.02 per hour . . . [and] pay a tipped employee direct wages as 
low as $4.23 an hour.”59 The court in Martins ruled that an issue of fact still remained 
 ________________________  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See generally Martins v. MRG of South Fla., Inc., 112 So. 3d 705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (where an 
employee sued her employer for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to pay her the minimum wage). 
 52. See id. at 706. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 706–07. 
 56. Id. at 706. 
 57. Martins, 112 So. 3d at 707. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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“[w]hether [MRG] [could] take [a] tip credit against training;”60 so the appellate 
court reversed the lower court’s ruling granting MRG’s motion for summary judg-
ment.61  
Furthermore, employers have demonstrated their lack of knowledge of the basic 
requirements of informing their employees of this separate minimum wage require-
ment. For example, in Hermoza v. Aroma Restaurant, LLC., the plaintiff, Hermoza, 
was an employee of Aroma Restaurant, LLC from April 22, 2008 through April 22, 
2011.”62 While working for Aroma, Hermoza “did not have a clear understanding as 
to how he was to be compensated for his work.”63 Hermoza brought suit against 
Aroma, alleging that Aroma “fail[ed] to pay [Hermoza] minimum wage.”64  
Aroma “argue[d] that the [suit] should be dismissed because [Hermoza] was a 
tipped employee who was paid the required minimum wage for tipped employees 
[of $3.50] . . . .”65 However, the court in Hermoza found that “the employer may 
only utilize [a tip credit] if ‘such employee has been informed by the employer of 
the provisions of [29 U.S.C. § 203(m)].’”66 The court ruled that because Hermoza 
was not informed “of the provisions of the FLSA regarding compensation for tipped 
employees,” that Hermoza “was not paid minimum wage for the hours he worked.”67  
Martins and Hermoza are cases that stand to prove a powerful issue within the 
realm of minimum wage standards in our country. No matter what regulations are in 
place and no matter what standards are imposed on employers to ensure that employ-
ees will be paid a lawful amount in wages, it is still not a fool-proof protection that 
all employees will be given the compensation afforded to them by the law. The same 
rings true for tipped-employee situations. If the employers in Martins and Hermoza 
were able to confuse the subtleties of tipped wages, any employer can do so in the 
tipped employee context. 
However, a bigger issue arises when consumers are taken into the mix. In the 
tipped employee context, the burden of bringing an employee to the federal mini-
mum wage initially lies on the consumers.68 What is shocking about this revelation 
is that consumers are not regulated by the law regarding tipping, payment of employ-
ees, or wage discrimination.69 Consumers not being regulated by anti-discrimination 
or wage laws allows for whatever discrimination facilitated by this process to flour-
ish, unchecked. For instance, in Martins and Hermoza, both claimants were able to 
 ________________________  
 60. Id. at 708. 
 61. Id. at 708–09. 
 62. Hermoza v. Aroma Rest., LLC, No. 11-23026-CIV, 2012 WL 273086, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2012). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at *2. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Questions and Answers About the Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, www.dol.gov/whd/min-
wage/q-a.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2017) (stating the minimum wage an employer must pay “tipped employees,” as 
long as the tips from consumers equal at least $7.25 per hour).  
 69. See United States: Tipping & Etiquette, www.tripadvisor.com/Travel-g191-s606/United-States:Tip-
ping.And.Etiquette.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2017) (stating that while tipping is not mandatory in most states within 
the United States, it is customary).  
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seek redress from the courts.70 But, with no cause of action to do so, tipped employ-
ees have no say in the discrimination presented by consumers. 
C. Florida Minimum Wage 
Florida has enacted a constitutional amendment which may help to alleviate 
some of these issues presented:  
Persons aggrieved by a violation of this amendment may bring a 
civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction against an Employer 
or person violating this amendment and, upon prevailing, shall re-
cover the full amount of any back wages unlawfully withheld plus 
the same amount as liquidated damages, and shall be awarded rea-
sonable attorney’s fees and costs.71 
However, nothing in this constitutional amendment addresses the direct issue plagu-
ing tipped employees in our fair state. The constitutional provision applies to an 
“employer or person violating” it.72 Nowhere does the state constitution impose a 
standard of liability toward consumers that may discriminate against a tipped em-
ployee due to any constitutionally-protected classification. For instance, the Florida 
Statutes have outlined that “employers shall pay employees a minimum wage at an 
hourly rate of $6.15 for all hours worked in Florida.”73 The statute clearly outlines 
and specifies that it is the employer’s duty to ensure that an employee reaches a cer-
tain minimum wage, not the duty of a consumer. The distinction is subtle, but Florida 
has left a means for workers to be discriminated against without a recourse. 
III. THE TIPPED EMPLOYEE’S PLIGHT: THE RACIAL STANDARD 
“[T]here are over 1.3 million African Americans, Asians, Hispanics, or Latinos 
working as restaurant servers, bartenders, barbers, hairstylists, cosmetologists, or 
taxicab drivers in the United States.”74 “[A]ll of these individuals are economically 
dependent on gratuities . . . in tipping.”75 “[T]ipping service providers is discretional 
and the sole actor involved is the consumer, thus allowing for direct tests for con-
sumer discrimination.”76 Disparate racial motivations in the tipping of service pro-
viders was highlighted in a 2005 study of “taxicab drivers in New Haven, Connect-
icut, Ayres, Vars, and Zakariya . . . .”77 In said study, it was “found that black drivers 
 ________________________  
 70. See Martins v. MRG of South Fla., Inc., 112 So. 3d 705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see also Hermoza, 
2012 WL 273086. 
 71. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 24(e). 
 72. Id. 
 73. FLA. STAT. § 448.110(3) (2016). 
 74. Zachary W. Brewster & Michael Lynn, Black—White Earnings Gap Among Restaurant Servers: A Rep-
lication, Extension, and Exploration of Consumer Racial Discrimination in Tipping, 84 SOC. INQUIRY 545, 547 
(2014). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 548. 
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were given significantly smaller tips than were white drivers and this was true for 
both white and black customers.”78  
In another study, “servers working in a full-service restaurant” were observed 
“in an attempt to replicate the previously documented seller race effects on tipping 
taxicab drivers.”79 In this second study, “the authors included a composite index 
measuring restaurant servers’ skills constructed from customers’ ratings of their 
servers’ appearance, friendliness, attentiveness, and promptness.”80 “Net of the ef-
fects of service skills on customers’ tipping decisions both black and white restaurant 
patrons were found to tip black servers less than they did white servers.”81 This study 
helped to support the case that “an unconscious bias for whites over African Ameri-
cans” exists among African-Americans and Caucasian-Americans.82 It was even de-
termined that customers rated their servers more favorably when it came to being 
waited on by someone of the same race.83  
In another study, African-American servers were determined to provide “better 
service relative to that provided by their white co-workers,” and it was still found 
that the African-American servers received a disparate amount of tips compared to 
their white co-workers.84 The studies presented highlight and outline the blatant bi-
ases that Americans can possess with regard to providing tips. The unfortunate real-
ity about these facts is that they mesh well with the issues regarding the tipped-em-
ployee minimum wage. Simply put, the necessity of a standard minimum wage is 
taken out of the hands of the employer and put into the hands of the public. With 
such a responsibility in the hands of the public, there are no safeguards in place to 
protect the classes of people the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 was made to pro-
tect. 
For instance, if an employer—under a normal wage scenario—wanted to dis-
criminate against an employee by paying him or her lower wages based off the em-
ployee’s “race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or 
marital status,”85 the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 would protect the employee. 
However, under the stark realities pointed out in the above-referenced studies, there 
is no provision within the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, or any of Florida’s laws, 
that would prevent a consumer from blatantly discriminating against a protected cit-
izen by providing a minimal or non-existent tip.86 Such actions would lead to the 
discriminated, tipped employees being required to work even harder than their co-
workers who are not being discriminated against to meet the minimum wage. 
 ________________________  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Brewster & Lynn, supra note 74, at 548. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 549. 
 84. Id. at 557–59. 
 85. FLA. STAT. § 760.10(1)(a) (2016). 
 86. See FLA. STAT. § 760.10 (2016) (including only violations in the context of employer, employment 
agency, labor organization, and joint-labor management committees, but not including an individual consumer in 
the coverage of the law).  
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IV. THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR PROVING A DISCRIMINATION CASE 
As outlined above, tipped employees stand to make an argument that they face 
an employer and state-sanctioned form of discrimination via the current tipped min-
imum wage standards. That evidence alone is not enough for a tipped employee to 
make a successful legal claim in the court of law to rectify this situation because 
such a specific claim does not exist in Florida law.87 Rather, a problem lies in the 
fact that the recourse that a tipped employee would seek is not the norm in the state 
of Florida. Case law and legislative acts have circulated primarily around remedies 
for employment discrimination in the form of refusing to hire someone, or refusing 
to promote someone.88 However, this wage discrimination issue is different from 
other wage concerns in Florida in that it does not involve an employer actively par-
ticipating in discriminatory practices, only an employer merely acquiescing to 
them.89 Therefore, in order to rectify a tipped employee’s grievance against this sys-
tem, the basic premises of anti-discrimination laws should be combined with the sit-
uation at hand to create a line of recourse for these tipped employees. 
For example, in order to establish a claim for racial employment discrimination 
under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, an employee must establish that “[t]he 
employee is a member of a particular race or ethnicity . . . [that the employee] is a 
‘qualified’ individual . . . [and that the employee] suffered the impacts of discrimi-
nation because of his race or ethnicity.”90 It is also important to note that “decisions 
construing Title VII guide the analysis of claims under the Florida Civil Rights Act 
[of 1992].”91 According to Title VII, “It shall be an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
. . . .”92 Analyzation of these elements is the key to finding recourse for the tipped 
employee’s indirect discrimination through the combined actions of consumers, em-
ployers, and the legislature. 
A. The Employee Is a Member of a Particular Race or Ethnicity93 
In the grand scheme of things, it is not difficult to discern whether someone is a 
member of a particular race or ethnicity. This element of making a potential claim 
against employers engaging in the discrimination practice of making their employees 
 ________________________  
 87. See id. (a violation of the statute by an individual consumer is not covered by the statute, so no claim can 
be brought against an individual consumer for a violation of the law).  
 88. See generally Patrick John McGinley, Elements of an Action, 21 Fla. Prac. § 903:1 (2015-2016 ed.) 
(Florida citizens are protected from job termination and job discrimination). 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Harper v. Blockbuster Ent. Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2016). 
 93. McGinley, supra note 88. 
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scavenge for tips is simple to prove generally by a physical observation of the claim-
ant. However, there have still been instances where an employee’s membership to a 
particular protected race or class has been an area of analyzation by the courts.94 
For example, in Tippie v. Spacelabs Medical, Inc., Stephanie Tippie brought suit 
against Spacelabs Medical, Inc. in a “complaint alleging national origin and gender 
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e, et seq., and the Florida Civil Rights Act . . . and race discrimination in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.”95 In Tippie, Tippie was employed by Spacelabs and 
had applied for a “‘Product Line Manager’ or ‘Senior Product Management’” posi-
tion with the company.96 Tippie argued that “Jukka Turtola, the decision-maker in 
[Tippie],”97 decided against hiring Tippie as a Product Line Manager on the grounds 
that she “sp[oke] some basic Spanish but [was] not native.”98 Meanwhile, Tippie 
argued that the position of Product Line Manager was given to an individual named 
Facundo Carrillo, who was “native in Spanish.”99 
The trial court in Tippie ruled that “Tippie did not present direct evidence of 
discrimination.”100 The evidence that Tippie presented was not enough to establish 
that she had been discriminated against for the purposes she presented she was dis-
criminated on.101 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Court 
agreed with the ruling at the trial level in Tippie.102 The Eleventh Circuit concluded 
that “[t]he district court did not err in dismissing Tippie’s § 1981 race discrimination 
claim because her only alleged evidence of discrimination was based on the fact that 
she was not a native of Latin America.”103 The court drew a distinction between 
claims derived from discrimination against natural origin and claims against an em-
ployee’s race.104 
Also, more examples exist as to whether someone fits into a particular race or 
ethnicity for purposes of making a successful Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 claim. 
For example, sex discrimination claims have their limitations, as outlined in Harper 
v. Blockbuster Entertainment Corp.105 In Harper, four males worked for Blockbuster 
Entertainment Corp.106 “In May of 1994, Blockbuster implemented a new grooming 
policy that prohibited men, but not women, from wearing long hair.”107 Following 
the implementation of the new grooming policy, Harper protested the new policy as 
 ________________________  
 94. See generally Tippie v. Spacelabs Med., Inc., 180 F. App’x 51, 53 (11th Cir. 2006) (discussing whether 
national origin was a member of a particular race or ethnicity). 
 95. Id.  
 96. See id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Tippie, 180 F. App’x at 54. 
 101. See id. 
 102. Id. at 56. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  
 105. See generally Harper v. Blockbuster Ent. Corp., 139 F.3d 1385 (11th Cir. 1998) (discussing the require-
ments and limitations of sex discrimination claims). 
 106. Id. at 1386. 
 107. Id. 
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being discriminatory against men by “refus[ing] to cut [his] hair.”108 Consequently, 
Blockbuster “terminated” Harper for refusing to cut his hair and protesting the 
grooming policy.109 Harper filed suit against Blockbuster alleging:  
(1) sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. 
(“Title VII”); (2) sex discrimination under the Florida Civil Rights 
Acts of 1992, Fla. Stat. §§ 760.01 [sic] et seq. (“Florida Civil Rights 
Act”); (3) unlawful retaliation under Title VII; and (4) unlawful re-
taliation under the Florida Civil Rights Acts.110 
The trial court granted Blockbuster’s motion to dismiss, which incited Harper’s ap-
peal to the Eleventh Circuit.111 The court discussed how Harper’s claim was barred 
by precedent stating “that differing hair length standards for men and women do not 
violate Title VII . . . .”112 Therefore, the court in Harper affirmed the decision of the 
trial court in that Harper’s argument was too attenuated from the actual standard for 
discrimination.113 
Meanwhile, the history of employment discrimination actions has actually pro-
vided case law as guidance for situations that may satisfy this prong of a discrimina-
tion suit. For example, in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company successfully sued the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on the grounds of sex discrimina-
tion.114 In Newport, after Congress “amend[ed] Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 ‘to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy,’”115 Newport 
“amended its health insurance plan to provide its female employees with hospitali-
zation benefits for pregnancy-related conditions to the same extent as for other med-
ical conditions.”116 
However, Newport’s new pregnancy plan provided “less favorable pregnancy 
benefits for spouses of male employees.”117 Before the changes to Newport’s policy, 
all covered men and women, whether they were employees or dependents, were 
treated similarly.118 However, after the changes took effect, Newport “provided the 
same hospitalization coverage for male and female employees themselves for all 
medical conditions, but [Newport] differentiated between female employees and 
spouses of male employees in its provision of pregnancy-related benefits.”119 One of 
 ________________________  
 108. Id. at 1387. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Harper, 139 F.3d at 1387. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 685 (1983). 
 115. Id. at 670. 
 116. Id. at 671. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 671–72. 
 119. Id. at 672. 
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Newport’s male employees brought a charge through the EEOC, asserting that New-
port “had unlawfully refused to provide full insurance coverage for his wife’s hospi-
talization caused by pregnancy.”120  
In Newport, the Supreme Court of the United States determined that Newport 
had participated in sex discrimination through its new “pregnancy-related bene-
fits.”121 The Court determined that Newport’s “practice [was] . . . unlawful”122 be-
cause it “provide[d] limited pregnancy-related benefits for employees’ wives, and 
afford[ed] more extensive coverage for employees’ spouses for all other medical 
conditions requiring hospitalization.”123 “Thus the husbands of female employees 
receive a specified level of hospitalization coverage for all conditions; the wives of 
male employees receive such coverage except for pregnancy-related conditions.”124 
The Court went on to say that “[t]he 1978 Act makes clear that it is discriminatory 
to treat pregnancy-related conditions less favorably than other medical condi-
tions.”125 
Although Tippie, Harper, and Newport do not deal with the issue of race directly, 
they illustrate the necessity of anti-discrimination protection from the government 
and the need for court intervention where the law is unclear on discrimination mat-
ters. Without the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 and Title VII, employers could 
blatantly invade the lives of their employees with discriminatory agendas by with-
holding certain benefits and rights afforded to other employees. For instance, as dis-
cussed supra, it would be relatively easy to ascertain that an African-American or 
Asian-American tipped employee belonged to a certain class of protected persons by 
observing his or her outward appearance. However, suppose that a tipped employee’s 
association with a particular protected class was not so readily observable? 
Just as in Tippie and Newport, the claimants in those cases did not belong to a 
class of protected people that were so readily observable. Such an observation is 
important for a tipped employee that could possibly bring forth a claim of discrimi-
nation based on unequal compensation.126 The fact remains that it is possible for a 
tipped employee to meet this element of proving a discrimination claim against an 
employer when that tipped employee belongs to a protected class and is forced to 
work harder for tips than his or her counter-parts that do not belong to such a class 
of persons. 127Coupled with the discriminatory tipping practice studies, this proposed 
element for the tipped employee’s plight should be enough to abolish the tipped min-
imum wage altogether. 
 ________________________  
 120. Newport, 462 U.S. at 674. 
 121. Id. at 683. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 683–84. 
 125. Id. at 684. 
 126. See Tom Jacobs, Black Restaurant Servers Get Smaller Tips, THE PACIFIC STANDARD (Sept. 4, 2014), 
https://psmag.com/black-restaurant-servers-get-smaller-tips-59216a5c4e77#.24a1kn67l. 
 127. See id. 
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B. The Employee Is a Qualified Individual128 
In a standard employment discrimination context, the person asserting the claim 
of discrimination would also need to prove that he or she was “qualified for, and 
applied for, a job.”129 For example, in Samedi v. Miami-Dade County, a woman 
named Francoise Samedi brought suit against Miami-Dade County on the grounds 
of discrimination “on the basis of sex and of national origin.”130 Samedi immigrated 
to the United States from Haiti in 1992.131 Upon arriving, Samedi was able to secure 
employment “through various temporary agencies.”132 “These agencies secured 
work for [Samedi] as a temporary employee in the Trash Division of the Solid Waste 
Management Department of Metro Dade County.”133  
At the beginning of her tenure with the Trash Division of the Solid Waste Man-
agement Department of the county, Samedi “spoke only Creole” and “spoke and 
understood very little English.”134 “[Samedi’s] lawsuit stems from numerous inci-
dents of heinous sexual assaults that two [Miami] employees, Lem Jones and Donald 
Godwin, allegedly committed against [Samedi] at various times . . . .”135 Despite the 
sexual assaults, Samedi forewent disclosing them to Miami “for fear that she would 
lose her job.”136 However, Samedi eventually “interviewed for a permanent job with 
[Miami] in March 1997, and on two other occasions.”137 “That position required 
communication skills such that the employee can both ‘instruct[] citizens in backing 
their vehicles in order to dump their trash’ and orally ‘inform[] the public as to the 
procedures for dumping.’”138 Also, the position “require[d] an eighth grade educa-
tion.”139 Although she continued to work for Miami, Samedi “did not receive an offer 
for this position.”140 
On August 25, 1997, Samedi, along with “other temporary workers,”141 began 
seeing a reduction in work hours.142 Samedi “and the other workers went to see [Mi-
ami] about the reduction in their work hours” and were “directed to the office of 
Pamela Payne, Chief of the Human Resources Division for [Miami’s] Department 
of Solid Waste Management.”143 It was then that Samedi reported her “allegations 
 ________________________  
 128. McGinley, supra note 88. 
 129. Samedi v. Miami-Dade Cty., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
 130. Id. at 1327. 
 131. Id. at 1324. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1324–25. 
 135. Samedi, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1325. 
 136. Id. at 1326. 
 137. Id. at 1326–27. 
 138. Id. at 1327. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Samedi, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1327. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
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of sexual assault and sexual harassment against Jones and Godwin.”144 “On Septem-
ber 8, 1997, [Samedi] lodged a County Affirmative Action Complaint and an EEOC 
Charge of Discrimination on the basis of sex and national origin discrimination.”145 
At trial, three concerns existed over Samedi’s qualifications for the permanent 
job she had interviewed for.146 The concerns brought forth by Miami are as follows: 
First, the job description for Waste Attendant I describes “comple-
tion of the eighth school grade” as part of the “desirable experience 
and training” for the position. 
. . . . 
Second . . . the Waste Attendant I job description lists among “illus-
trative tasks” for the position [as] . . . “[i]nstructs citizens in backing 
up their vehicles in order to dump their trash;” and “[i]nforms the 
public as to the procedures for dumping at the trash transfer stations 
both orally and through the use of instruction pamphlets.” 
. . . . 
Third . . . [Samedi] did not come across well during her Waste At-
tendant I interview . . . .147 
 
The court in Samedi sided with Miami, finding that Samedi could not speak English, 
and the court even noted that those interviewing Samedi were not interested in 
providing Samedi with the position partly because she could not speak English with 
the proficiency needed for the job.148 Therefore, the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Florida ruled that Samedi failed to prove her prima facie 
case because “[Samedi] did not show that she was qualified for the job for which 
[Miami] did not hire her.”149 
The Samedi case illustrates the application of the second element to a traditional 
Title VII claim in action. Although it was not a favorable outcome for Samedi, it 
provides enough analysis to allow future courts to apply to similar discriminatory 
situations. Also, it provides a basis for a proposal of a different element to be applied 
to the instance where a tipped employee is being made to work harder for tips than 
his or her co-workers that are not being discriminated against for reasons of race. 
As applied in Samedi, the requirement to prove that the claimant was qualified 
for the position is important to a claim for race discrimination in that, without being 
qualified for the job one is fighting for, one cannot be surprised when an employer 
does not hire one for the position. The same line of logic should hold true for this 
 ________________________  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1344. 
 147. Samedi, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1344–45. 
 148. Id. at 1345. 
 149. Id. 
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standard for the type of wage discrimination that impacts the tipped employee com-
munity. But, seeing as in a tipped employee’s position the tipped employee is not 
being denied a promotion or a position based on his or her race, such a standard 
would not be applicable. Therefore, to make a prima facie case for compensation 
discrimination of tipped employees, a tipped employee would have to prove that he 
or she works as well as any other employee that is not being discriminated against. 
Such a standard would be difficult to prove, but so long as the tipped employee 
is able to provide objective proof of his or her diligence to the job, he or she should 
be able to satisfy this requirement. This standard would coincide with the same qual-
ification standard imposed in Samedi in that the standard in Samedi went to prove an 
objective capability of the allegedly aggrieved individual, the absence of which 
would render discrimination impossible. The same would ring true for a tipped em-
ployee in this precarious situation. A tipped employee could bring evidence of per-
formance evaluations and co-worker testimony in order to prove that this employee 
had worked enough to objectively receive a certain amount of tips per shift. This 
would be the only means in which a tipped employee could fight for a fair wage 
because there is no recourse against the consumers. 
C. The Employee Has Suffered the Impacts of Discrimination Because of 
His Race or Ethnicity150 
This final element of a prima facie case of discrimination is not traditionally 
difficult to prove.151 Even when an employer is discriminating against an employee’s 
age, this element can be met with ease.152 For instance, in Sheppard v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., Diana Sheppard worked for Sears “as a service technician” when she 
was about thirty years of age.153 Sheppard had been described by supervisors as being 
a “‘good technician’ and “‘an excellent technician, good associate.’”154 In her capac-
ity as a service technician, “Sheppard would visit customers’ homes to repair wash-
ers and dryers.”155 Therefore, “[d]riving is an important part of the service techni-
cian’s job.”156 Because of this, Sears implemented a “program, called ‘fleet safe,’ 
that provides a means for the public to provide feedback regarding Sears’ drivers 
using a toll-free number.”157 A report for unsafe driving, per Sears’ policy, could 
result in “disciplinary action, up to and including termination.”158 
 ________________________  
 150. McGinley, supra note 88. 
 151. See Sheppard v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 391 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1177 (S.D. Fla. 2005); see also Maynard 
v. Bd. of Regents of Div. of Univs. of Fla. Dep’t of Educ. ex rel. Univ. of S. Fla., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 
2003). 
 152. See Sheppard, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. 
 153. Id. at 1172. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Sheppard, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 1172. 
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“On July 29, 1997, Sheppard was involved in an automobile accident while driv-
ing a Sears vehicle.”159 However, “Sheppard was later told by her supervisor, Ben-
nett Woods, that this 1997 accident was not considered as part of her driving rec-
ord.”160 “On May 16, 2001, Sheppard was involved in a second automobile accident 
while driving a Sears vehicle.”161 Woods “issued a written warning because of the 
[2001] accident.”162 At this point, Sheppard was put “on notice that she could lose 
her driving privileges if she was involved in another accident.”163 Despite this, “[o]n 
January 3, 2002, Sheppard was involved in an accident when the wheel of her Sears 
van rubbed against the door of another driver’s vehicle.”164 Consequently, “Woods 
issued another written warning to Sheppard which stated: ‘On 1/04/02 Sheppard 
while backing her Sears vehicle in [a] customer drive way she was turning her front 
wheel and [her] tire scratched customer car door.’”165 In 2002, after several other 
driving infractions, Sheppard met with Woods “to [be] inform[ed] that Sears was 
revoking her driving privileges.”166  
Sheppard eventually brought “four counts of discrimination” against Sears.167 
The counts were as follows: 
Count One, for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”), Count Two, for age discrimination un-
der the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), Count Three for sex dis-
crimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), and 
Count Four for sex discrimination under FCRA.168 
The court’s analysis in Sheppard led to the elements of a prima facie case for 
employment discrimination being discussed, notably that “she suffered an adverse 
employment action.”169 Regarding this particular element, the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida found that the issue of whether she had 
suffered an impact of discrimination was “without dispute.”170 It was clear to the 
court that because of this entire situation, Sheppard had suffered adverse treatment 
in the workplace. 
The facts in Sheppard illustrate the third, standard prima facie element to a dis-
crimination claim well, and the fact remains that if it were applied to combat the 
plight of the tipped employee outlined above, it would work nicely. For instance, the 
third element, as applied in Sheppard, went to show that there was an actual harm 
 ________________________  
 159. Id. at 1173. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Sheppard, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 1173. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1174. 
 167. Id. at 1171. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 1177. 
 170. Sheppard, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. 
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done to the claimant.171 Sheppard potentially could feel the sting of discrimination, 
as she claimed, because she was removed from working as a driver.172 Sheppard’s 
claim was essentially that, had she not been discriminated against, she would not 
have been taken off of driving duty.173 Despite the Southern District of Florida ruling 
against Sheppard in the end, the court still found that Sheppard had at least met this 
element.174 
As applied to the tipped employee minimum wage context, the impact of the 
discrimination is clear: because a tipped employee is being discriminated against by 
customers with regard to paying tips, said employee must compensate more than his 
or her counterparts that are not being discriminated against. Thus, tipped employees 
who are discriminated against must work harder to earn the legal minimum wage in 
our state. Therein lies a tipped employee’s satisfaction of this element of the pro-
posed standard of review. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The largest issue is that even if there were a way for a tipped employee to prove 
a prima facie case of wage discrimination, there would be no recourse for employ-
ment discrimination against a consumer because the consumers are not employers in 
this context. Employers are able to allow such discrimination to continue without 
any recourse from the government or their employees. After all, when at the end of 
the day, employers may wipe the entire issue under the carpet by paying whatever 
difference remains after a minority employee has been unable to make enough to 
meet the federal minimum wage of $7.25 through tips alone. Further, in the current 
system, the responsibility—arguably proportionally—of providing a minimum wage 
to employees is passed essentially from the employer to the consumers. The issue 
with this methodology is that the law, as outlined above, imposes a requirement for 
employers to pay their employees a minimum wage, not for consumers to do it for 
employers. 
The proposal of a new standard of review is a viable option to easing the distress 
of tipped employees who are unprotected when it comes to their employers sanction-
ing customer-driven discrimination. However, under the current structure of our 
laws, such protections for the tipped employees are not in place. The best option is 
to abolish this standard once and for all. As discussed before, the Florida Constitution 
promises to its citizens a certain handful of protections with regard to wages.175 But, 
further on in the Florida Constitution, the legislature is allowed to impose restrictions 
on those protections just because an employee is receiving tips.176  
Such a contradiction would not impose an issue were it not for the fact that dis-
crimination in the tipping industry has been proven to exist. But with no recourse 
available but the one proposed above, minority tipped employees will still be in a 
 ________________________  
 171. Id. at 1174, 1178. 
 172. See id. at 1182. 
 173. Id. at 1181. 
 174. Id. at 1178. 
 175. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 24(c). 
 176. Id. 
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position to work harder than their co-workers. Florida has let its people down and 
for the reasons outlined above, Florida must rectify this wrong by abolishing the 
tipped minimum wage in Florida. 
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